This paper is dedicated to our teacher, Wolfgang Rautenberg x1. Introduction. A simulation of a logic by a logic is a translation of the expressions of the language for into the language of such that the consequence relation de ned by is re ected under the translation by the consequence relation of . A well{known case is provided by the G odel translation, which simulates intuitionistic logic by Grzegorczyk's logic (cf. 11] and 5]). Such simulations not only yield technical results but may also provide a deeper understanding of the simulated logic. This is certainly the case with G odel's translation which in e ect translates the intuitionistic connectives by a modal rendering of the semantic acceptance clauses. In this paper we will use the simulation technique to obtain two types of reductions. One is the reduction of normal logics with several operators to mono{modal logics. The other is a reduction of non{normal logics to normal bimodal logics.
The rst results concerning simulations of modal logics were the results of 28] and 29] where simulations are used to obtain substantial negative results in modal logic. Thomason shows how to simulate polymodal logics | even second order logic | in monomodal logic. Since counterexamples can be constructed much easier using several operators, this o ers a rather easy method for systematically creating counterexamples in monomodal logic. Unfortunately, simulations were shown to preserve only negative properties of logics such as incompleteness, lack of nite model property etc. There is an array of problems raised in 14] and 13] which cannot be attacked this way because they require completeness properties to be preserved as well. We show here that this is in fact the case. We will apply this to solve some open problems in modal logic. Moreover, using these techniques it is proved in 18] that there exist logics which have nite model property locally but are globally incomplete. Other problems, such as the decidability of nite model property or of decidability itself have a straightforward solution in bimodal logics (using word problems). By appealing to the simulation method, the same is proved for monomodal logic. (See also 17].) This shows quite clearly the usefulness of simulations as a tool in modal logic. Moreover, we will show that the simulation de ned by Thomason gives rise to an isomorphism from the lattice of bimodal normal logics onto an interval in the lattice of monomodal normal logics.
Not much is known about non{normal modal logics. Neighbourhood{ semantics, which is usually applied to investigate them, does not allow to analyse modal formulas as rst order properties. General completeness results, as for Sahlqvist{logics in the case of normal polymodal logics, are not known so far. In this situation it seems reasonable to investigate non{normal modal logics by simulating them as polymodal normal ones. This paper denes simulations of this type for all monotonic modal logics as well as a large class of classical modal logics. By applying Sahlqvist's Theorem to the bimodal interpretations we get a general completeness result for monotonic modal logics. Applied to normal logics the simulation gives us new insights into the relation between Kripke{semantics and neighbourhood{semantics. Conversely, undecidability results for monotonic modal logics can be used to derive corresponding results for normal bimodal systems. To obtain the required undecidability results for monotonic modal logics equational theories of lattices are interpreted in them.
The positive results on simulations show that there is no essential difference between the classes of monomodal normal logics, monotonic logics, and polymodal logics.
This paper is structured as follows. We begin by de ning the notion of a simulation of a consequence by another and prove some general results. After that we de ne our notions and notation from modal logic. The paper then splits into two parts. The rst is dedicated to the reduction of non{ normal logics to bimodal normal logics. The second treats Thomason{type reductions of polymodal logics.
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x2. Simulations. A propositional language consists of a (mostly) denumerable set of propositional variables p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : and a nite set of connectives f 1 ; f 2 ; : : :; f n . For propositional languages L 1 ; L 2 over the same set of variables an interpretation of L 1 in L 2 is a map which assigns to the variables uniformly a formula of L 2 and to each formula f(P 1 ; : : :; P k ) of L 1 uniformly a formula of L 2 . More precisely, an interpretation (?) F : L 1 ?! L 2 must satisfy (f(P 1 ; : : :; P k )) F = (f(p 1 ; : : :; p k )) F Likewise, for any expression P we have var(P F ) var(P).
A consequence (relation) over a language L is a relation`between subsets of L and individual formulas satisfying the following postulates.
(ax) If P 2 X then X`P.
(mon) If X Y and X`P then Y`P.
(trs) If X`P for all P 2 Y and Y`Q then X`Q.
(str) If X`P and is a substitution then (X)` (P).
The consequence`satis es replacement if (rep) P 1 a`P 2 implies Q P 1 =p] a`Q P 2 =p]: ( Here and in what follows P 1 a`P 2 abbreviates the conjunction of P 1`P2 and P 2`P1 .) Now consider a consequence`1 over L 1 , a consequence`2 over L 2 and an interpretation F of L 1 in L 2 . Then`2 simulates`1 with respect to F, if for all ? L 1 and P 2 L 1 , ?`1 P i ? F`2 P F .
The following is a fundamental property of simulations.
Proposition 1 Suppose that`2 simulates`1 with respect to some interpretation F. Then if`2 is decidable, so is`1. Moreover, the complexity class of the decision problem for`1 is at most that of`2.
For a proof just observe that by de nition the problem ?`1 P is equivalent to ? F`2 P F . Since the translation is linear in the size and increases the length only by a constant factor, the complexity class of the simulated problem is (at most) that of`2. A priori, any connective can be translated by an arbitary expression. However, under mild conditions we can show that the interpretation of boolean connectives must be an expression equivalent to that boolean connective. In the case of modal logics this means that under these conditions only the modal operators receive a nontrivial interpretation. Call an interpretation F atomic if p F = p for all propositional variables p. In this case we will often write f F (P 1 ; : : :P k ) instead of the somewhat longwinded f(p 1 ; : : :; p k ) F P 1 =p 1 ; : : :; P k =p k ] Proposition 2 Suppose that^; : 2 L i and that`i are consequences over L i , for i 2 f1; 2g. Assume that`i, i 2 f1; 2g, restricted to the language with connectives f^; :g both coincide with classical propositional logic, and that`2 simulates`1 with respect to an atomic interpretation F. Then (i) p^q a`2 p^F q and (ii) :p a`2 : F p.
Proof. (i) We have p^q`2 fp; qg`2 p^F q`2 fp; qg`2 p^q. (ii) It is readily checked that P is`1{inconsistent i P F is`2{inconsistent. The language L n of n{modal propositional logic has the connectives^; : and 2 i , i < n. The symbols _, !, >, and ? have the usual meaning. Sometimes we use fancy symbols such as , etc. instead of indexed boxes. A classical (n{)modal logic is a subset of L n which contains all classical tautologies and is closed under substitutions, modus ponens and p $ q=2 i p $ 2 i q (i < n). The smallest classical n{modal logic is denoted by E n . The smallest classical modal logic containing a classical modal logic and a set of formulas ? is denoted by + ?. Classical (n{)modal logics containing 2 i (p^q) ! 2 i q; for i < n; are called monotonic (n{)modal logics. The smallest (n{)monotonic logic is denoted by M n . Monotonic (n{)modal logics containing 2 i p^2 i q ! 2 i (p^q) and 2 i >; for i < n; are called normal (n{)modal logics. The smallest n{modal logic is denoted by K n . We shall often write K for K 1 , E for E 1 and M for M 1 . Recall that normal modal logics are precisely those classical modal logics which contain 2 i (p ! q) ! (2 i p ! 2 i q) and are closed under (mn): p=2 i p, i < n.
The consequence relation associated with a classical modal logic is de ned by ?` P i P is derivable from ? by modus ponens.
Clearly` satis es replacement and we can apply Proposition 2. A modal logic simulates a modal logic with respect to an interpretation F if` simulates` with respect to F.
We shall introduce neighbourhood semantics for monotonic 1{modal logics (monotonic modal logics, for short For normal modal logics the semantics reduces considerably in its complexity as we can now have relations instead of neighbourhoods. A 1{frame is a generalized monomodal frame, a 2{frame is a generalized bimodal frame. A similar convention is used for 3{frames, polyframes. A kripke n{frame is a pair f := hf; h< i ji < nii, where f is a set and < i f 2 a binary relation over f for each i < n. An n{frame is a pair hf; Fi where f = hf; h< i ji < nii is an kripke n{frame, and F a system of subsets of f closed under intersection, complements and the operations i a := ftj(8u)(t < i u ) u 2 a)g A subset of f is called internal in F if it is a member of F. A valuation into F is a function assigning to each variable an internal set. In the usual way, hF; ; xi j = P is de ned by induction over P. Furthermore, we write hF; xi j = P if for all valuations , hF; ; xi j = P, and F j = P if hF; xi j = P for all x 2 f. Given a point x 2 f we call the transit of x in F the set of points y such that there exists a chain hx i ji < pi with x = x 0 , y = x p?1 and such that for all i < p ? 1 there exists a j i < n with x i < j i x i+1 . If the transit of x is the entire underlying set, f, then x is called a root of F and F is called rooted at x; F is rooted if there exists a root. An n{morphism between n{frames F and G is a map : f ! g satisfying three conditions. (p1) If x< i y for x; y 2 f then (x)< i (y). (p2) If (x)< i w for x 2 f, w 2 g there exists a y 2 f such that x < i y and (y) = w. (p3) For each internal set b of G the preimage ?1 b] := fxj (x) 2 bg is an internal set of F. An n{modal algebra is a structure A = hA; 1; ?; \; h i ji < nii for which the reduct to f\; ?; 1g is a boolean algebra, and such that for every i < n and a; b 2 A we have i 1 = 1 and i (a \b) = i a \ i b. Valuations are functions from the set of variables into A. can be naturally extended to a homomorphism from the free algebra of formulae into A, which we also denote by . If a formula P receives the value 1 under we write hA; i j = P; moreover, A j = P if for all , hA; i j = P. We put Th A := fPjA j = Pg; this is called the theory of A. For a class K of algebras we put With an n{frame hf; h< i : i < ni; Fi we associate a n{algebra F + = hF; 1; ?; \; h i ji < nii and a kripke (n{)frame F ] = hf; h< i : i < nii. For a kripke frame f, f ] = hf; 2 f i is an n{frame. n{frames of this form are called full. An n{algebra A de nes a canonical n{frame over the set pt(A) of ultra lters (`points') by letting U < i V , ( An n{frame is di erentiated if whenever x 6 = y there exists an internal set a such that x 2 a but y 6 2 a. F is called tight if whenever x 6 i y there exists an internal set a such that x 2 i a but y 6 2 a; and F is compact if for every U 2 pt(F + ) we have T U 6 = ;. An n{frame is re ned if it is di erentiated and tight, and descriptive if it is re ned and compact. As is well known, an n{frame is descriptive i it is isomorphic to a frame of the form A + . The classes of di entiated, tight, re ned, full (=kripke), nite and descriptive n{frames are denoted by n Df, n Ti, n R, n Krp, n Fin and n D. Finally, the class of all n{modal is denoted by n G. We will drop the superscripts whenever possible.
A logic is a subset of the set of formulae over a xed set V of variables.
We can always take V = fp i ji < g, some cardinal number. De ned in this way, depends on . It should be clear, however, that we can always choose a presentation of in the form K X, for some X with var(X) V @ 0 .
We call n{axiomatizable if there exists a set X such that var(X) V n and = K X. is nitely (recursively) axiomatizable if X can be chosen nite (recursive).
De nition 4 Let X be a class of n{frames and an n{modal logic. is called compact (complete) with respect to X if for every ( nite) set X and every formula P, if X 0 P there exists a model hF; ; xi such that F 2 X, and F j = and hF; ; xi j = X; :P.
A logic is compact i it is compact with respect to n Krp in the sense of the de nition above. Let us also discuss some other specializations of this de nition. Every logic is compact with respect to n D, the class of descriptive frames, by Stone representation and the fact that for every consistent set X there exists a {algebra A, a valuation and a point U such that (X) U.
Hence every logic is complete with respect to n D.
With a logic we can associate another deducibility relation that also has as its set of theorems. It is denoted by and called the global consequence relation, as opposed to the local consequence relation, which is` . We put X P if P can be deduced from X using the rules of modus ponens and (mn): X Q=X i Q, i < n. Thus, while (mn) is in general only an admissible rule of normal modal logics, it is a derived rule of . To understand the meaning of the term global, let us note the following.
Denote by X the closure of X under (mn). It consists of all formulae of the form P, where is a sequence of modal operators and P 2 X.
Proposition 5 Let be a normal modal logic. Then X P i X ` P.
A proof can be found in 24]. Now we say that X holds globally in a model hF; ; xi if hF; ; xi j = X . This is the same as saying that X holds everywhere in the submodel generated by x. We omit the simple proof. Of course, F 3 has a nite simulation. We have chosen this simulation because we will need the fact, that 0 has no predecessor in the rst relation and no successor in the second relation in F i .
We now come to the exact de nition of the simulating frames hg; Ni mn i , If we apply this result to a normal monomodal logic it has the consequence that is complete with respect to neighbourhood{semantics i a bimodal simulation is complete with respect to Kripke{semantics. Recall now that there are normal modal logics which are complete with respect to neighbourhood{semantics but incomplete with respect to Kripke semantics (consult 10]). Hence there are Kripke{incomplete normal logics which have a bimodal simulation which is Kripke{complete. The explanation of this phenomenon is simple: A normal modal logic is complete with respect to neighbourhood{semantics i the corresponding variety of modal logics is generated by full modal algebras, that is algebras h2 g ; \; ?; 2i, where 2g = g and 2(a \ b) = 2a \ 2b. But a logic is complete with respect to Kripke{semantics i the corresponding variety is generated by full algebras which satisfy the continuity axiom Proof. The implication P 2 ) P F 2 follows immediately from the fact that is closed with respect to the rule p ! q=3 1 2 2 p ! 3 1 2 2 q. Now suppose that :P 6 2 . Then there is a general N h {frame G = hg; N; Gi for , a valuation and x 2 g with hG; ; xi j = P. Take an i 2 f1; 2; 3g such that F i is a frame for and consider the frame G mn i = hh; R 1 ; R 2 ; Bi. Then, by the construction of B, is a valuation of G mn i . By Lemma 11, hG mn i ; ; xi j = P D . So the theorem is shown if G mn i is a frame for . Let Q 2 . By Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 (2), Q D is valid in all new points (i.e., the points which are not in g) in G mn i . Q D holds in all points in g since each valuation of G mn i can be restricted to G, by the de nition of B, and we can apply Lemma 11 (1 (s2) Proof. The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 14. The only di erence is in the proof that hg; N t ; Gi mn i is a general frame whenever hg; N; Gi is a N h {frame satisfying (i) and (ii). The crucial step is to show that 3 1 b i 2 B for b i = T ffhC; 0ijC a; C 2 C t gja 2 I i g \ T ffhC; 0ijC \ a 6 = ;; C 2 C t gja 2 J i g: The frames of the form hg; N t ; Gi mn 1 Let L denote the equations in L de ning lattices. For a set of equations in L and 1 ; 2 2 L we write L j = 1 = 2 i 1 = 2 follows from L in equational logic. The closure of L under j = is denoted by L + . In order to simulate equational theories of lattices as modal logics we need the following observation.
Proposition 22 All varieties of lattices are generated by complete lattices.
Proof. It is readily checked that all varieties of lattices are generated by lattices with maximal and minimal elements. Consider a lattice A with maximal and minimal elements. There is an embedding of A into the complete lattice I(A) of ideals of A. Hence the proposition is shown if A j = P = Q ) I(A) j = P = Q holds for all P; Q 2 L. Assume A j = P = Q but I(A) 6 j = P Q. Then Proof. Let hg; Ni be a N{frame for and C = C hg; Ni]. Take an i 2 f1; 2; 3g such that F i j = . Now construct F = hg; Ni mn i = hg f; R 1 ; R 2 i. We de ne a relation R 3 on g f by putting xR 3 y i x = hC; 0i and y 2 g ? C, for a C 2 C. It follows by induction that for all Q 2 L 1 and valuations of h:
For all x 2 g : hhg; Ni; ; xi j = Q i hhh; R 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 i; jg; xi j = Q F . Now the proof is analogous to the proof in the monotonic case and left to the reader. a x 8. The Thomason{Simulation.
In a series of papers, S. K. Thomason has shown how to simulate normal polymodal logics by normal monomodal logics. We will present this construction and prove some very strong theorems about it. Take a bimodal frame F = hf; <; J; Fi. Then put f sim := f fw; bg f g, where w, b, are new symbols. We write x w instead of hx; wi and x b instead of hx; bi. We also put f t := f g and use the notation x t for . This will shorten a lot of casewise distinctions. The names are mnemonic; w for white, b for black and t for terminal. We let and range over the set fw; b; tg. Also, for subsets a f we write a w for a fwg and a b for a fbg. a t will on this convention be empty if a is, and otherwise a t = f g. (There is a small quirk concerning the possibility that f is empty. In that case, f w and f b are empty as well, while f t = f g. This exceptional case never causes any trouble in the theorems. So it will never be excluded, although one has to take care with the notation here.) On f sim we de ne the relation as the union of three relations, r , and . Thus F sim is closed under . a
We call frames of the form F sim simply simulation frames. It is worth remembering that simulation frames are always connected via , and so they are not decomposable into a disjoint union. Moreover, any point in a simulation frame sees a dead end (i. e. a point without successors) in at most two steps. The sets f w , f b and f t are de nable in any of the thus constructed frames by a formula without variables, hence they are always internal. Consider, namely, the following formulae. Proof. The case where F is empty is easily dealt with; thus we assume from now on that it is not empty. Suppose that F is re ned. We show that F sim is re ned. (1.) F sim is di erentiated. Let x ; y 2 f sim and x 6 = y . Then either x 6 = y or 6 = . The case where = t or = t is easily dealt with. Assume next = (6 = t). Then x 6 = y and so there exists a set c 2 f such that x 2 c, y 2 ?c. Then x 2 c , y 2 (?c) ?c . Thus the case 6 = remains. Here we may assume without loss of generality = w. Then x 2 f w but y 6 2 f w , and f w is internal. This shows that F sim is di erentiated. (2.) F sim is re ned. Let x y . We have to nd a set a such that x 2 a but y 2 ?a. If = t then a := ; is a good choice, April 7, 1997 and if = t and = b then a := f w f b is a good choice. Thus we are left with ; 6 = t. If = = w then we must have x 6 y and so there exists a set c 2 F such that x 2 c but y 2 ?c. Now put a := c w f b f t . Then y w 2 ?a but x w 2 a. If = = b then not x J y and so there exists a c such that y 2 ?c and x 2 c. Put a := f w c b . Then x b 2 a but y b 2 ?a. The case 6 = remains (and both are 6 = t). Here we have x y exactly when x 6 = y. Assume that = w and = b; the other case is analogous. Since F is di erentiated we have a set c such that x 2 c but y 2 ?c. Put a := f w c b f t ; we get x w 2 a and y b 6 2 a, as required. Hence F sim is tight, and thus re ned. Now assume conversely that F sim is re ned. Then F is re ned as well. For if x 6 = y, then in particular x w 6 = y w and we get by assumption a set c such that x w 2 c but y w 6 2 c. Let c = a w 1 a b 2 a t 3 for some a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 2 F. It follows that x 2 a 1 but y 6 2 a 1 , and so F is di erentiated. Next, if x 6 y then x w y w and we get a set c such that x w 2 c but y w 6 2 c. Decompose c in the same way as before. Then it follows that x 2 a 1 but y 6 2 a 1 . The case of J is similar. Next we take compactness. Assume that F is compact; let U F sim be an ultra lter. Then three cases can arise. Reason as in the case (2.). Now assume conversely that F sim is compact, and take an ultra lter V F. Then U := fa w 1 a b 2 a t 3 ja 1 2 V; a 2 ; a 3 Proof. Since F is not empty, there exists a point x 2 f. First we show that for every point x in f w there exists a unique point y in f b such that x y, and that then also y x. The existence of y is immediate from the rst postulate of (a) (e. g. by substituting > for p). However, assume there exists a y 0 6 = y such that x y 0 and y 0 2 f b . Then there is a set c such that y 2 c but y 0 6 2 c. Now put (p) := c. Then hF; ; xi j = w^ b p, but hF; ; xi j = : b p. This violates the rst axiom of (a). Now, given y there exists by the second axiom of (a) a z such that y z and z 2 f w . By the rst axiom of (b) and the fact that the frame is re ned we obtain that z = x. Analogously we show that for every point y from f b there exists a unique x 2 f w such that y x, and that for this x we have x y as well. Now we show that there is exactly one point in f t . Let us rst prove f t 6 = ;. If f t = f then f t is nonempty, since f is rooted. Now assume that there exists a x 2 f ? f t . Then x 2 f w f b . If x 2 f w then x y for a y 2 f t and if x 2 f b then there exists a y 2 f w such that x y. Thus f t is nonempty.
We show that f t contains not more than one point. To that end, let r be the root of F. If r 2 f t , we have succeeded. For then F contains only one point. If r 2 f b then there exists z 2 f w such that r z r, and so z is a root of F as well. Thus let us assume that r 2 f w . We will show that for all x 2 f w , and all z, z 0 from f (y) : If r z 2 f t ; x z 0 2 f t ; then z = z 0 :
From (y) we immediately obtain that f t contains only one point. It is clear that there exist frames for Sim which are not simulation frames; simply take the disjoint union of two simulation frames. However, this is in some sense the only exception.
Proposition 30 A re ned Sim{frame F is a simulation frame i t can be satis ed at exactly one point i F is not a disjoint union of two proper generated subframes. A Sim{algebra A is a simulation algebra i t is an atom i A is directly indecomposable.
Proof. If F is empty, or if the algebra is trivial, the above equivalences hold. So this case will not be considered below. The interesting part is the following. Assume that t is satis able at more than one point, say at x 1 and x 2 , where x 1 6 = x 2 . Since F is re ned, there exists a set c such that x 1 Proposition 31 Let F be a re ned nonempty frame for Sim. The mapping collapsing the set t into a single point is a p{morphism of F onto a simulation frame.
Proof. t is a generated subset. Hence the mapping is a p{morphism on the underlying kripke{frame. Moreover, since t is internal, the mapping is actually a p{morphism of the frame. The image of the map is a simulation frame by Proposition 30. a We now de ne the unsimulation of a re ned Sim{frame F as follows. We put f sim := f w < := \(f sim ) 2 J := fhx; yij(9x; y 2 f b )(x x y y)g \ (f sim ) 2 F sim := fa \ f sim ja 2 Fg F sim := hf sim ; <; J; F sim i This is immediately veri ed to be a 2{frame. This is well{de ned even if F is empty. In that case the unsimulation is also empty. This case is exceptional insofar as the simulation of F sim is not isomorphic to F. So, that case has to be taken care of independently. Next, if we have a 1{morphism : F ! G, where F and G are Sim{frames, we put sim := f sim . This is a 2{ morphism. For let x < y. Then x y, from which (x) (y), since is a 1{morphism. Hence, by de nition of sim , sim (x) < sim (y). Likewise for x J y. Now assume that sim (x) < u. Then, as (x) u, we know that there exists a y 2 f such that x y and (y) = u. It is clear that y must be in f w , since u is in g w . Hence x< y, and sim (y) = u, as required. Similarly for J.
Proposition 32 The unsimulation map (?) sim is a covariant functor from the category of nonempty re ned Sim{frames onto the category of re ned 2{frames. Moreover, for every 2{frame we have (F sim ) sim = F. a Proposition 33 The category of nonempty simulation frames and the category of 2{frames are isomorphic. a This last proposition is not a direct consequence of Proposition 32; we can only show that these categories are equivalent (which would be su cient for our purposes). But the construction of F sim in set theoretic terms can be done in such a way that (F sim ) sim is always the same as F.
In addition, if F is a simulation frame and : G F, then G is a simulation frame and there exists a 2{morphism such that = sim ; and if : F G then G is a simulation frame and there exists a 2{morphism such that = sim . (We employ the convention that denotes an injective and a surjective map.)
In a similar fashion the unsimulation is de ned for algebras. 
The following can now be concluded. with respect to a class X of re ned 2{frames then so is sim with respect to X sim . And conversely, if sim is complete with respect to a class Y of re ned 1{frames then is complete with respect to Y sim . In the next two sections we will improve these results drastically.
The simulation can be generalized in a straightforward way to obtain an isomorphism from the lattice E K n onto the interval Sim(n; 1); Thch n?1 ] in the lattice E K 1 , where Sim(n; 1) is some monomodal logic and ch n = hf0; 1; : : :; n?1g; >i denotes the transitive, irre exive n{element chain. The details will only be sketched. Namely, given f = hf; h< i ji < nii, f sim will be de ned thus. Each point x will be multiplied into distinct copies x i , one per basic operator; a copy of ch n is added. The x i are kept distinct by the points in the chains that they can see. Moreover, we let x i x j i i 6 = j. The rst equivalence asserts that local satis ability in a frame is equivalent to local satis ability of X in F sim in the simulating frame at white' points, the second asserts that global satis ability of X is equivalent to global satis ability of w ! X in the simulating frame. The third asserts that validity of X in a frame is equivalent to validity of w ! X in its simulation.
Corollary 41 Let = K 2 X. Then sim = Sim fw ! P jP 2 Xg.
In particular, if is n{axiomatizable, so is sim .
Proof. Put := Sim fw ! P jP 2 Xg. We show that the rooted rened frames validating coincide with the rooted re ned frames validating sim . This establishes the rst part of the theorem. The second follows immediately. Now let F be a rooted frame which is not a frame for sim .
Let x be a root of F. Then there exists a bimodal rooted frame G such that G sim is isomorphic to F. We then have that G is not a frame for , and thus there exists a P 2 X such that G 2 P. By the lemma above, F 2 w ! P .
Hence F is not a frame for . The argument can be run backwards as well. Assume that F is a rooted re ned frame which is not a frame for . Then F 2 w ! P for some P 2 X. F is a simulation frame and so we may assume that for some G, F = G sim . By the previous lemma, hG; ; yi 2 P. So G is not a frame for . By de nition of sim , F (which is G sim ) is not a frame for sim . a
The next theorem provides one half of the simulation theorem. Before we can state it, we have to provide some more de nitions. An n{modal logic is elementary ( {elementary) if the class of kripke{frames of is elementary ( {elementary). Here, the language to speak about n{frames is rst{order predicate logic with equality ( : =) and binary relation symbols < i , i < n, which get interpreted by the corresponding relations in the frame.
The following so{called restricted quanti ers are de ned.
(8y > j x) := (8y)(x < j y: ! : ) (9y > j x) := (9y)(x < j y:^: )
For the elementary language, too, we can de ne a translation on formulae. is obtained from (positive) atomic formulae x : = y, x < i y, i < n, using^, _, and the restricted quanti ers. In 31] the following class of formulae is de ned. Call an n{modal formula P a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula if it is composed from variables and constants using :,^, _, j and j (j < n) such that for all variables p either (i) no positive occurrence of p is in a subformula of P of the form Q^R or j Q, j < n, if that formula is in the scope of a k , k < n, or (ii) no negative occurrence of p in P is in a subformula of the form Q^R or j Q, i < n, if that occurrence is in the scope of some k , k < n. This describes a wider class of formulae. However, for every Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula P there exists a Sahlqvist{formula
De nition 42 An n{modal logic has local interpolation if whenever P` Q there exists a formula R such that var(R) var(P) \ var(Q) and P` R` Q. has global interpolation if whenever P Q there exists a R such that var(R) var(P) \ var(Q) and P R Q.
Theorem 43 The simulation map preserves the following properties of logics.
n{axiomatizability, nite axiomatizability, recursive axiomatizability, G{persistence, R{persistence, D{persistence, being Sahlqvist, elementarity, {elementarity.
The simulation re ects the following properties of logics.
local/ global completeness with respect to kripke frames ( nite kripke frames), local/global interpolation.
Proof. The rst set of properties is clear. For persistence only G{persistence is not a direct consequence. However, by a theorem of van Benthem 31], a logic is G{persistent i it is 0{axiomatizable. So the claim follows from the rst set. For Sahlqvist logics, it is enough if we show that if P is a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula, so is w ! P (viewed as a formula in the language with , ). Now, it is checked that the translation is such that occurrences of variables in P are in one{to{one correspondence with occurrences of variables in w ! P . Moreover, if p occurs positively (negatively) in P, its related occurrence in w ! P is also positive (negative). Also, if p occurs in a subformula Q^R ( Q, Q) within a formula S ( S) then its related occurrence in w ! P is in Q ^R ( T for T = w ! Q , T for T = b ! b w Q ) within the subformula U, where U = w^S (within the subformula U, where U = b^ b w S ). Hence w ! P is a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula. Next assume that is ( {)elementary. Then the class of kripke frames is determined by some condition (set ? of conditions). Then the class of kripke frames for sim is determined by some sentence characterizing the Sim{kripke frames plus e (? e ). Now we turn to interpolation. We make use of the following criteria. Theorem 45 (Maksimova) has local interpolation i it has the superamalgamation property. has global interpolation i it has the amalgamation property.
The proof is an immediate generalization of 20]. Now assume that sim has global interpolation. We have to show that has global interpolation as well. Now we will show how to axiomatize the unsimulation of a logic on the basis of an axiomatization for it. The proof is rather longwinded. Before we enter it, we need some terminology. Let P be a formula and Q a subformula of P. Fix an occurrence of Q in P. A modal cover of that occurrence of Q is a minimal subformula R of modal degree greater than Q containing that occurrence of Q. We also say that that particular occurrence of R modally covers Q. If Q has a modal cover, it is unique and a formula beginning with a modal operator. (We will often speak of formulae rather than occurrences of formulae, whenever the context allows this.) Now let P be a formula of the language with operators , , 2 fw; b; tg. Let us agree to say that an occurrence of a formula Q in P is {covered if it modally covered by a formula of the form R or R. Call P and Q white{equivalent if w`S im P $ Q and black{equivalent if b`S im P $ Q. Given a formula, we say that a subformula occurs white if it is not in the scope of a modal operator or else is w{covered. A subformula occurs black if it is b{covered.
If P occurs white (black) in R, and P is white{equivalent (black{equivalent) to Q, then that occurrence of P may be replaced in R by Q preserving white{ Lemma 46 Let P be a formula in the language with and , 2 fw; b; tg. There exists a nite number n and formulae Q i and R i , i < n, such that Q i is nonmodal for all i < n, and R i is in the language with w ; b , w and b for all i < n, and P is white{equivalent to the formula _ De nition 48 Call a formula P white based if there do not exist occurrences of subformulae Q, R, S and T such that Q b{covers R, R b{covers S, and S b{covers T.
Lemma 49 For every formula P there exists a formula Q which is white{ based and white{equivalent to P.
Proof. Suppose that there is a quadruple hQ; R; S; Ti of occurrences of subformulae such that Q b{covers R, R b{covers S, and S b{covers T. Then there exists such a quadruple in which Q occurs white. Now replace the occurrence of T by w b T. Since T is black equivalent with w b T, this replacement yields a formula P 0 which is white equivalent to P. Now repeat this procedure with P 0 . It is not hard to see that this process terminates with a white based formula. (For example, count the number of occurrences of quadruples hQ; R; S; Ti such that Q b{covers R, R b{covers S, and S b{ covers T. It decreases by at least one in passing from P to P 0 . If it is zero, the formula is white based.) a From now on we can assume to be in Case (ii). Furthermore, by Lemma 49, we can assume that P is white based, and (inspecting the proof of that lemma) that P is built from variables and negated variables, using^, _, and the modal operators w , b , w and b .
Let b (P) denote the maximum of nested black operators ( b , b ) in P.
Call P thinner than Q if either b (P) < b (Q) or P is a subformula of Q.
We will show that for given white based basic P there exists a simulation transparent formula Q which is white{equivalent to P on the condition that this holds already for all white based basic formulae P 0 thinner than P. If P = p we are done; for P is simulation transparent. Likewise, if P = :p. Suppose P = P 1^P2 . P 1 and P 2 are thinner than P. Therefore there exist simulation transparent formulae Q 1 and Q 2 such that Q i is white{ equivalent to P i , i 2 f1; 2g. Then Q 1^Q2 is white{equivalent to P 1^P2 .
Similarly for P = P 1 _P 2 . If P = w P 1 there exists a simulation transparent Q which is white{equivalent to P 1 . So w ! P 1 a`S im w ! Q, and therefore w P 1 a`S im w Q; it follows that w Q is white{equivalent to P. Similarly for P = w P 1 . We are left with the case that P is either b R or b R. The formula S is of course not uniquely determined by P, but is unique only up to equivalence. The proof of Lemma 50 is actually a construction of S, and so let us denote by P the particular formula that is obtained by performing that construction.
For the second claim, assume that P is a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula. Then there exists a simulation transparent P which is white equivalent to P. Inspection of the actual construction shows that the transformation of P to P preserves positive and negative occurrences of variables. Moreover, suppose that (P ) is not Sahlqvist{van Benthem. Then it contains a positive occurrence of a variable p in a subformula of the form Q^R, Q or Q in the scope of a or , and likewise a negative occurrence of that same variable in a subformula of such kind. It is not hard to see that the corresponding occurrences of p in P are in a similar con guration, and that | nally | there are corresponding occurrences in P which are also in such a con guration. Thus P is not Sahlqvist{van Benthem. (A remark. This last step is not straightforward to prove, the details are cumbersome, since a lot of elementary transformations are being made to pass from P to P . The interested reader may simply note that each of these transformations takes a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula into a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula (and back). Spelling out these details is rather unrevealing.) a Now take a set X of monomodal formulae; put X := fP jP 2 Xg. Assume that F is a simulation frame and hF; ; xi j = w; X. Then we have hF; ; xi j = w; ((X ) );
where is a substitution satisfying (p ) = p, (p ) = b p, (p ) = t p. De ne a valuation sim on F sim by sim (q) := (q). x is of the form y w for some y 2 f sim ; in fact, by construction, y w = x. By the previous results, hF; ; xi j = w; (X ) , hF sim ; sim ; xi j = X :
It therefore turns out that the satisfaction of X in a simulation frame at a white point is equivalent to the satisfaction of X in the unsimulation of the frame. The satisfaction of X at a black point is equivalent to the satisfaction of b X := f b PjP 2 Xg at a white point. The satisfaction of X at f t is likewise reducible to satisfaction of t X, which is de ned analogously. Now let be a monomodal logic contained in the interval Sim; Th ]. We will show that it can be axiomatized by formulae of the form w ! Q. To that end, let = K X and let P 2 X. For simplicity we may actually assume that X = fPg. Then = K ft ! P; w ! P; b ! Pg.
Since is a frame for , t ! P can only be a theorem if it becomes a boolean tautology after substituting > for maximal subformulae of the form Q (and ? for maximal subformulae of the form Q). Hence, t ! P is in only if P is an instance of a boolean tautology. However, in that case P is a theorem of K. b ! P is Sim{equivalent to w ! b P. So, = K fw ! P; w ! b Pg, as promised. So we can always assume that an axiom is of the form Q := w ! P for some P. (This follows independently from the surjectivity of the simulation map and the fact that an axiomatization of this form for simulation logics has been given above.) Now Q is rejected in a model based on F i P is rejected at a white point of F i P is rejected in a model based on F sim .
We summarize our ndings as follows. The case of unsimulating elementary properties is likewise more complex than the simulating part. Take a formula in the rst{order language for 1{modal frames. We may assume (to save some notation) that the formula does not contain 8. Furthermore, we may assume that the formula is a sentence, that is, contains no free variables. However, we do not assume that structures are nonempty. We introduce new quanti ers 9 , 2 fb; w; tg, = y x J y ? t ?
? ? Proof. In view of the results of the preceding section we only need to prove one direction in each of the cases. Finite and recursive axiomatizability are clear. Likewise R{persistence and D{persistence. For G{persistence note that it is equivalent with 0{axiomatizability. For the property of being Sahlqvist, we have established that if w ! P is a Sahlqvist{van Benthem formula, so is P . Now suppose that sim is ( {)elementary and let X be the class of kripke frames for it. Then the class of simulation frames in X is elementary (since such a frame is a simulation frame i it satis es This axiom is rst{order and says that for every point s every successor t related by anx{path from s and every successor u related by aỹ{path from s we have t = u. Here, anx{path is a path formed byx under the identi cation of b (= black) with J and of w (= white) with <. Now let T be given. With T we associate the following two logics.
(T) := K:Alt 1 K:Alt 1 fE m jE 2 Tg (T) := (T) > > Let F, G be n{modal frames. G is a subframe of F if g 2 F, < g i = < f i \(g g) and G = fa \ g : a 2 Fg = fa 2 F : a gg. In other words, subframes are relational reducts to internal subsets of a frame. For the purpose of this de nition, kripke{frames are identi ed with the corresponding full frames.
A suframe logic is a logic whose class of frames is closed under taking subframes (see 32]). The axioms of (T) are elementary, and the corresponding 1 st {order formulae can be written using only restricted universal quanti ers. Thus the logics (T) are subframe logics (see 32] or 17]), which is Claim (4.) of the theorem below.
Proposition 56 Let T be a Thue{process over A = fw; bg and := (T) and := (T) be as above. The following holds.
1. and are nitely axiomatizable by one{letter axioms. 2. and are complete.
3.` P i >; > P. 4 . is a subframe logic. 5. has the local nite model property and is locally decidable.
The rst claim is straightforward since alt 1 can be axiomatized by p ! p, and the second follows from a theorem of 32], which states that any extension of polymodal K:Alt 1 is complete; this generalizes a theorem of Bellissima 1] . The third claim is straightforward. A proof can be found in 17]. The fourth follows by inspection on the elementary condition imposed by the axioms of . The axioms Alt 1 are preserved when passing to a subframe, and so are the axioms E m . The last claim now follows easily.
Assume that P 6 2 . Then there exists a model hf; ; xi j = :P, since is complete. Now let d be the maximum nesting of modal operators in P, and let g be the subset of all points reachable from x in at most d steps following the relations < or J. Then g is nite, containing at most 2 d+1 ? 1 points. The subframe based on g, g, is a frame for . Let (p) := (p) \ g. Then hg; ; xi j = :P. The local decidability of is an immediate consequence. undecidable, so is (T). Now let T be decidable. Let us call a formula P straight if it is of the form hxiC, where C is a variable or a negated variable. It is not hard to show that in K:Alt:D K:Alt:D, any formula is deductively equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of straight formulae. (Moreover, there is an e ective procedure which transforms a given formula into a deductively equivalent formula of such a form.) Therefore, it is enough to show that for such formulae, satis ability is decidable in (T). For that it is in turn enough to show that the satis ability of a conjunction of straight formulae is decidable. Let Q = V i<k hx i iC i be such a formula. By (1.), Q is satis able i hSgr(T); ]i 2 :Q i there exists a valuation such that hSgr(T); ; ]i j = Q. hSgr(T); ; ]i j = Q is equivalent to (y). and there is no z such that y n < z < y i+1 . The condition of modularity guarantees that n |-if it exists | is independent of the sequence Y . The lattices E K n are distributive, and therefore modular.
Theorem 58 The following properties of logics are undecidable for nitely axiomatizable monomodal logics on the basis of a nite axiomatization has P, then both and have P. Now take a logic that fails to have P. Then fails to have P i is consistent. It follows that to have P is undecidable, and that there exist 2 @ 0 logics without P. Such properties are G{persistence, R{persistence, D{persistence, completeness, the nite model property, elementarity, Sahlqvist, Halld en{completeness, interpolation and many more. (To show this, one needs to establish that these properties are re ected under fusion in each of these cases. It is enough to take a monomodal and a bimodal logic. Re ection of P is straightforward for the listed properties, see for example 19] . The preservation of P is in many cases much harder to show, but not needed here.) However, this argument does not allow to deduce that there are 2 @ 0 logics with P. In the case of tabularity this is false. This scheme is therefore asymmetrical in this respect. We will not spell out the results in detail; once the way to obtain them is known, the results become of lesser importance.
